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Abstract 
Private browsing facilities are part of many mainstream Internet browsing applications and 
arguably, there is now more awareness of their function and purpose by the average Internet 
user. As a result the potential for those engaging in malicious and/or illegal browsing 
behaviours, to do so in a ‘privatised’ way is increased. Many private browsing modes are 
designed to be ‘locally private’, preventing data denoting a user’s browsing actions from 
being stored on their device. Such actions, potentially compromise the availability of any 
evidential data, provide an investigatory headache. This work documents the examination of 
30 web browsers to determine the presence of a ‘private mode’, and where available, the 
‘privateness’ of said mode. Our test methodology is documented and results and limitations 
described for the purpose of open, transparent scrutiny and evaluation from those operating 
in this area. 
 
Keywords: Private Browsing; Internet; Digital Forensics; Internet History; 
Investigation  
 
1 Introduction 
‘Private browsing’ (PB) is a generalised term utilised to reference mechanisms which are 
designed to prevent a user from having evidence of their web-browsing behaviour stored on 
their local device. From the outset, it is key to emphasise that in this context, private 
browsing refers only to those platforms which offer local privacy, and these should be 
distinguished from applications such as Tor (see https://www.torproject.org/) which also 
focus on online-privacy, and facilities which prevent remote tracking and monitoring, such as 
the W3C’s Tracking Preference Expression (aka “Do Not Track”). Dependant on the browser 
in user, an associated PB facility is referred to in different terminology; ‘incognito mode’ in 
Chrome, ‘InPrivate’ in Edge and the now unsupported Internet Explorer browser and a 
‘private window’ in Firefox.  
 
Arguably, through the increased sensitivity and publicity around privacy protection and the 
regulation of one’s digital footprint when online, PB technologies are likely to be in more 
frequent operation on a user’s device. Whilst it remains difficult to attribute definitive usage 
statistics to such actions, consensus surrounding online privacy provides an insight. In 2016, 
the use of a PB window was identified as the most popular form of online privacy measure 
globally (Statista, 2016). In the United States alone, around 33% of users are reported to 
utilise PB, where over 70% admit to deleting their Internet History (Statista, 2017). Whilst 
media coverage and increased notability of PB services has resulted in both widespread 
knowledge of it and understanding of its functionality, there remains an assumed assertion 
that substantial assessments of its local privacy have been undertaken, specifically from the 
context of a forensic examination. Yet this is not the case, and there is a limited set of 
academic commentaries which directly address the findability of PB session information 
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 following its utilisation. Whilst informal, forensic tool vendors and private organisations often 
pass comment via blog posts or corporate newsletters (see IntaForensics’s (2016) 
discussion on mobile PB and comments from Magnet Forensics (2013)). As a result, there is 
a gap in formalised knowledge with regards to definitively establishing how truly private PB 
facilities are.  
 
While this may seem trivial, this lack of clarity has a significant impact on law enforcement 
forensic investigations and their approaches. Many investigations focus on locally resident 
data, ranging from traditional ‘dead-analysis’ of devices to Sexual Harm Prevention Orders 
(SHPO) in England and Wales (replacing previously implemented Sexual Offences 
Prevention Orders (SOPOs)) under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA), the latter posing 
an investigatory challenge with potential significant consequences. This paper provides an 
analysis of 30 available web browsers to determine their potential PB capabilities. The 
implemented PB test methodology is discussed in detail and results are presented 
highlighting those applications which offer a PB function and in turn whether or not it is in 
fact private, following digital forensic analysis. Finally, discussions and limitations are 
offered. 
 
2 Private Browsing 
PB is a feature which has long since been on the radar of digital forensic practitioners. The 
risk it poses is arguably straightforward; any process which operates in a way which is 
designed to prevent potentially evidential content being stored on a local device (and 
therefore findable through examination techniques) raises investigatory concerns.  Whilst PB 
itself has many legitimate uses and is not anti-forensic per se (Horsman and Errickson, 
2019), it can be used with anti-forensic intent. Where Internet evidence forms the crux of an 
investigation, the absence of this content will pose regulatory issues. As a result, 
determining the extent and success of PB technology supports law enforcement in their 
approach to digital examinations of Internet content by helping to address the following 
points. 
 
1. Where PB is suspected of occurring, knowing the success of a particular browser’s 
PB facility helps to prevent unnecessary data processing (and time wastage) where 
browsing data does not actually exist on a device. 
2. Knowing where PB may ‘leak’ browsing session information improves examination 
efficiency and prevents this content from being overlooked. This is particularly 
important where on-scene triage takes place, seen in some cases where a SHPO 
has been imposed. 
3. Effective PB facilities require the acquisition and examination of alternative sources 
of browser information such as Internet Service Provider logged content.      
 
Private browsing modes have been the focus of much informal commentary and 
experimentation since their mainstream marketing and implementation. Whilst many 
academic studies have assessed the ‘privateness’ of these modes, there are arguably less 
studies which provide a definitive decision, backed with a documented transparent test 
methodology designed to assess a service’s ability to prevent private data being stored from 
a browsing session.  
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 Research into PB must be continuous as web browser technology continues to develop at a 
pace as vendors seek to enhance the user experience and functionality for those operating 
their product. In addition, browser vendors are often reactive to any reported issues present 
in their software and seek to rectify this with the release of frequent updates. Therefore, both 
minor and major software updates may lead to PB data leakage if subsequent 
implementations have compromised its function and gone untested. Furthermore, 
development of the operating system(s) in which PB are usable may lead to the passive 
capturing of PB data. As a result, both differing versions of the browser itself and the 
underlying platforms and operating systems should be continually tested in combination with 
each other in order to maintain knowledge of the ‘privateness’ of a particular PB application.  
 
2.1 Some Existing Studies 
Satvat et al., (2014) provide an insight into the vulnerabilities of private browsing sessions 
across Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer and Safari. The potential for plugin (also termed 
extension) vulnerabilities are noted, whilst limitations with residual data being held in 
physical memory are noted. In addition, program crashes and manually initiated 
bookmarking are noted as methods which may cause privacy leaks. Whilst the work did ‘not 
observe any timestamp change of files under the profile directory after a private browsing 
session’ it is difficult to infer from this statement alone the effectiveness of the local privacy 
afforded by these browsers. Testing took place on Mozilla Firefox (19.0), Apple Safari 
(5.1.7), Google Chrome (25.0.1364.97) and IE (10.0.9200.16521). Chivers’s (2014) analysis 
of Internet Explorer version 10 indicated ‘that InPrivate browsing records can be reliably 
identified’  on a local machine, particularly where a machine has been powered down during 
an InPrivate session. Whilst the study provides some insight into the recoverability of private 
session data, it is confined to a single browser vendor and version. Work by Gabet et al., 
(2018) compared ‘three enhanced privacy web browsers (Dooble, Comodo Dragon and 
Epic) and three commonly used web browsers in anonymous browsing mode (Chrome, 
Edge and Firefox)’ with inconclusive results as which performed better from a privacy 
perspective. Muir et al., (2019) indicate that records of session activity following use of the 
Tor Browser Bundle can be recovered with a focus noted for the NTUSER.DAT.log 
transaction log. Yet Jadoon et al’s., (2019) study of Tor makes no reference to such potential 
for recovered artefacts. More bespoke browsers have been targeted in recent work with 
Wang et al., (2018) providing an analysis of the ‘Browsar’ application and Reed et al., 
tackling ‘Epic Privacy Browser’.  
 
The use of volatile memory is often cited as a location of private browsing history recovery 
(Dave et al., 2014; Satvat et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2018; Muir et al., 2019; Ohana and 
Shashidhar, 2013; Ghafarian and Seno, 2015, Case and Richard III, 2017), however it is 
necessary to note that this work does not cover physical memory acquisition and analysis for 
PB content. Physical memory acquisition is still not common practice at all scenes and as 
physical memory must be collected before power is removed, in most cases this information 
may not be available to those investigating PB behaviours. Therefore as previous works 
have noted PB content is often in physical memory, this work opts to focus on examining 
hard disk drive content. 
  
3 Methodology  
Whilst studies of singular or small subsets of PB modes have been carried out, this work 
offers a review of 30 browsers. We have opted for a test platform of Windows 10 due to its 
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 wide-spread popularity, with a reported almost 70% market share (Statista, 2019). All 30 
browsers were located using the Google search engine, demonstrating accessibility to those 
who have a device and Internet connection. Regarding the work carried out, this article 
offers the following contributions: 
 
1. A defined transparent methodology documenting test actions, the test platform and 
procedural tasks undertaken as part of the analysis. In doing so, effective scrutiny 
and evaluation of the work by peers is facilitated, allowing known or unknown 
constraints to be identified.  
2. A benchmark test to determine the privacy of 30 browsers within a set of documented 
known documented conditions. It is important to define the circumstances of the 
tests in order to determine the boundaries of applicability of presented results, and 
where further testing may be required.      
 
3.1 Context 
Whilst the need to determine how effective PB services are, it is also necessary to offer 
context regarding the importance of knowing this information. The two main contexts to 
consider during a PB investigation are on-scene and in-lab. On-scene triage is often 
constrained by factors such as limited time and tool-type, which can mean only a targeted 
(and subsequently limited) approach to finding any potential evidential data is taken 
(Garfinkel, 2013; Horsman et al., 2014). In comparison, in-lab processes may provide for the 
use of more comprehensive examination processes where time and resource constraints 
may be less (or indeed not relevant). Therefore in the presented experimentation, 
consideration has been given to the processes which have been implemented as part of 
digital forensic analysis of PB data in order to replicate both triage and comprehensive 
procedures. 
 
3.2 Configuration 
Table 1 documents the five test search terms and subsequently visited URLs utilised as part 
of our experimentation process. Prior to testing, our test platform was confirmed as having 
no instances of these strings present, following preliminary keyword searching to prevent 
contamination and false positives.  
 
 
All testing took place using a stock Windows 10 virtual machine (VM) which was installed 
based on a standard Windows 10 ISO file acquired from the academic software licence 
portal (https://onthehub.com/). A Windows 10 VM was subsequently prepared in which to 
perform testing. Once prepared, this VM was forensically imaged and an elimination hash 
database was produced. The VM was subsequently exported as an appliance (OVA file) in 
order to deploy elsewhere. The decision to carry out our testing via this method was to 
ensure a consistent, stock environment across all the browsers being tested 
 
The stock VM appliance was deployed to each individual laboratory machine and each was 
assigned a respective web browser to investigate. Prior to interacting with the VM itself, the 
web address of each browser was identified on an external machine to limit the searching 
required within the VM itself in order to find and download the relevant browser installer files. 
Once installed, each test browser within each VM was used to execute the same test 
browsing actions (described in Table 1). A series of prescribed browsing tasks were carried 
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 out in each VM. By performing exactly the same tasks in each VM, this allowed for 
consistent and reliable searching and investigation of the evidence subsequently. The VM 
was shutdown following the standard method. The decision to perform a standard, shutdown 
as opposed to a hard power-off was taken in order to mimic what was considered to be 
normal behaviour by a person utilising private browsing over a protracted period of time.  
 
Each VM hard drive (.vmdk) was then forensically imaged into Expert Witness Format (.E01) 
for subsequent examination and loaded into X-Ways Forensics 19.7 to perform a 
Simultaneous Search (aka keyword search covering both standard Ansi, Unicode-UTF8 and 
Unicode-UTF16 formatted text). This process was done, in order to mimic a triage process 
which could be carried out on-scene offender processing, such as those instances where an 
offender is a managed sex offender. Typically a Simultaneous Search will provide faster 
results regarding keyword hits, but will not effectively handle content which for example has 
been compressed/encoded etc. Following a basic Simultaneous Search a Refine Volume 
Snapshot (aka evidence processing) was completed, followed by a Simultaneous Search. 
This process takes longer but provides for a more comprehensive examination where 
compressed volumes for example are uncompressed making them searchable, thereby 
mimicking a more comprehensive, in-lab examination.  
 
The digital forensic image was also loaded into Griffeye Analyze DI Pro 18.5. The standard 
processing options, along with the LACE Carver v.12.8.56, were selected. The previously 
discussed elimination-hash database was then used to eliminate irrelevant files to allow for 
more efficient and accurate identification of any images of pertinence. 
 
 
4 Results 
Table 2 offers an overview of the performance of those browsers tested. Of the 30 browsers 
tested, one was paywalled (Puffin), four encountered runtime issues (Lynx, Links, Falkon, 
Konqueror) and three did not have PB modes (GreenBrowser, Netsurf and Sleipnir). This left 
22 browsers with an operation 22 PB mode for testing. Of these 22 browsers, following 
testing, five browsers were found to have ‘leaked’ PB session data. 
 
From the five browsers seen to have leaked PB data; Avant, Comodo Dragon, Edge, Epic 
and Internet Explorer, a breakdown of keyword hit locations for URL information is offered in 
Table 3 and the number of hits offered in Table 4. It was found that a triage-style keyword 
search (i.e. a simultaneous search of the evidence with no processing) was successful in 
recovering positive keyword hits in all cases where the performance of a volume snapshot 
followed by a keyword search was also successful. Whilst the more comprehensive 
examination and keyword search often resulted in larger numbers of keyword hits (see Table 
4), there were effectively no occasions where evidence was missed by just performing a 
simultaneous search with no prior processing of the evidence. 
 
4.1 Picture Review 
In addition to keyword string matching for Internet history records, each case has been 
carved for the presence of any cached imagery deriving from any of the test browsed 
websites using Griffeye’s DI Analyze Pro with LACE plug-in. All images were manually 
reviewed and those relevant highlighted with originating system locations noted in Table 5. 
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It should be noted that whilst five browser tests indicated PB website string data was 
recoverable, only three browsers (Avant, Epic and Internet Explorer) cached images to the 
local machine during testing.  
 
5 Analysis and Concluding Thoughts 
We note that the 30 targeted browsers performed as documented within the confines 
documented our methodology. As a caveat to the results offered, we feel that they must not 
be overstated and we cannot go as far as to say that those browsers which performed 
privately during our tests are confirmed and completely private in all circumstances. The 
reason for such statements lie with the following points: 
 
1. Our chosen virtual machine platform ‘Virtual Box’ reports limited support for platform 
hibernation. As a result, it is possible that the browsers may leak PB content to the 
Hiberfil.sys on non-virtual platforms. 
2. The length of time a browsing session takes place for may also be a factor, where 
both the Hiberfil.sys (as noted above) and system paging via the Pagefile.sys may be 
forensically valuable. Varying the length of browsing sessions and examining the 
impact of prolonged PB sessions on potential data leakage is an under-researched 
area and requires further work within the digital forensic field.  
3. The impact of different hardware configurations should also be taken into account 
where for example, different amounts of system RAM may result in different memory 
caching processes and subsequent volumes of leakage.  
4. Virtualisation as a comparable platform raises some questions as whilst it is 
frequently adopted as a testing platform to combat the difficulty of testing on physical 
equipment, there remains a gap in research regarding the accuracy of its 
implementation. 
 
Notwithstanding that there may be external factors such as those described in Muir et al. 
(2019) which result in leakage of PB data to the disc which have not been investigated here, 
the research conducted here highlights that this leakage does not appear to occur in a virtual 
environment which does not support virtual memory. The precise cause of the leakage 
documented in Muir et al. has not been clearly established, however it is immediately 
apparent that there are 2 common-sense, obvious causes: 
 
● A flaw in the browser design and development leading to data being leaked outwards 
from within, i.e. the browser is to blame 
● The operating system taking more control over the browser than it should, leading to 
data being extracted from without, i.e. the operating system is to blame 
 
Either way, the results of this research have assessed and clearly demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the PB function itself within each browser. 
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Figure 1: Methodology used for PB study 
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 Table 1: Documented test web browser data (Table submitted as separate file). 
Search Term URL Visited 
"blackbag mobilyze" 
https://www.blackbagtech.com/software-
products/mobilyze.html 
"griffeye" https://www.griffeye.com/  
"lunastar comic cast" http://lunastar.thecomicseries.com/ 
"TDFCon" http://www.tdfcon.com/ 
"pintofscience" https://pintofscience.co.uk/  
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Table 2: A breakdown of the results for the 30 chosen browser platforms (Table submitted as separate file). 
Browser Version Release date Active Development? Download ink Private Function Is it 
Private? 
Avant 12.5.0.0 2019-05-18 Yes http://www.avantbrowser.com/download.aspx
?uil=en 
Yes No 
Brave 0.65.118 No Date Yes https://brave.com/ Yes Yes 
Chrome 76.0.3789.0 Frequent Yes https://www.google.co.uk/chrome/ Yes Yes 
Chromium 76.0.3805 No Date Unknown https://www.chromium.org/getting-
involved/download-chromium 
Yes Yes 
Comodo 
IceDragon 
64.0.4.15 January 2019 Yes https://browser.comodo.com/ Yes Yes 
Comodo 
Dragon 
73.0.3683.75 No Date Yes https://browser.comodo.com/ Yes No 
Dooble 1.56e November 
2017 
April 2019 Github https://textbrowser.github.io/dooble/ Yes Yes 
Edge 44.17763.1.0 No Date Yes Proprietary  Yes No 
Epic 62.0.3202.94 No Date Unknown https://www.epicbrowser.com/ Private when proxy 
is on 
No 
Falkon 3.1.0 x64 No Date No (both x64 and 32 bit will 
not run) 
https://www.falkon.org/download/ N/A N/A 
FireFox 67 Frequent Yes https://www.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/new/ Yes Yes 
GreenBrowser 6.9.1223 Dec 2016 No https://greenbrowser.en.softonic.com/ No N/A 
IE 11.55.17763.0 No Date No Proprietary  Yes No 
Konqueror N/A N/A N/A https://konqueror.org/ N/A N/A 
Links Flagged as 
malicious 
Flagged as 
malicious 
Flagged as malicious http://links.twibright.com/ N/A N/A 
Lynx 2.8.9 2018 Will not run on Windows 10 https://lynx.invisible-
island.net/current/#major_docs 
N/A N/A 
Maxthon 5.2.7.2000 2018 Yes http://www.maxthon.com/mx5/ Yes Yes 
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 Midori 0.5.11 No Date Yes https://www.midori-browser.org/download/ Yes Yes 
Netsurf 3.8 2017 no (last reported update in 
2018) 
https://www.netsurf-browser.org/ No N/A 
Opera 15 4-1-2019 Yes https://www.opera.com/download Yes Yes 
Pale Moon 28.5.0 April 2019 Yes https://www.palemoon.org/ Yes Yes 
Puffin Paywalled Paywalled Paywalled https://www.puffin.com/ N/A N/A 
Seamonkey 2.49.4 July 2018 no  (last reported update in 
2018) 
https://www.seamonkey-project.org/releases/ Yes Yes 
Sleipnir 6.3.7 Unknown Unknown https://sleipnir.en.softonic.com/ No N/A 
SlimJet 22.0.4.0 No Date last reported update in  
March 2019 
https://www.slimjet.com/ Yes Yes 
Tor Browser 60.7.0esr (64bit) No Date Yes https://www.torproject.org/download/ Yes Yes 
Torch 65.0.0.1617 (32 
bit) 
No Date Yes https://torchbrowser.com/tour Yes Yes 
UC Browser 7.0.185.1002 2018 Yes https://www.ucweb.com/ Yes Yes 
Vivaldi 2.5.1525.46 No Date Yes https://vivaldi.com/features/ Yes Yes 
WaterFox 56.2.10 No Date Yes https://www.waterfox.net/releases/ Yes Yes 
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 Table 3: A breakdown of the keyword hit locations for URL information for the Avant, Comodo Dragon, Edge, Epic and Internet 
Explorer browsers (Table submitted as separate file). 
Basic:- Simulataneous Search 
Browser 
Name Location 
Avant $MFT 
 $Logfile 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default\Cache 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default\Code Cache\js 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default\Session Storage 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default\Local Storage\leveldb 
 Freespace 
Comodo 
Dragon \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Temp\7ZipSfx.001\ccav_installer.msi 
Edge 
\Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\AC\MicrosoftEdge\User\Default\Rec
overy\Active\{58D38B7A-81AB-4A8E-ACED-5A32599E789B}.dat 
Epic Freespace 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Epic Privacy Browser\User Data\Default 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\EpicPrivacyBrowser\UserData\Default\Cache 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\EpicPrivacyBrowser\UserData\Default\Media Cache 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\EpicPrivacyBrowser\UserData\Default\Session Storage 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\EpicPrivacyBrowser\UserData\Default\Local Storage\leveldb 
 \Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat 
Internet 
Explorer $MFT, 
 $Logfile 
 $Extend\$UsnJournal 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Low\IE\ 
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  \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Active 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\AC\Temp 
 \Windows\System32\LogFiles\WMI 
 \Windows\Temp 
 Freespace 
 
Advanced:- Refine Volume Snapshot 
Browser 
Name Location 
Avant $MFT 
 $Logfile 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default\ Web Data 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default\Cache 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default\Code Cache\js 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default\History 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default\Session Storage 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default\Local Storage\leveldb 
 Freespace 
Comodo 
Dragon \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Temp\7ZipSfx.001\ccav_installer.msi 
Edge 
\Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\AC\MicrosoftEdge\User\Default\Rec
overy\Active\{58D38B7A-81AB-4A8E-ACED-5A32599E789B}.dat 
Epic Freespace 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Epic Privacy Browser\User Data\Default 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\EpicPrivacyBrowser\UserData\Default\Cache 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\EpicPrivacyBrowser\UserData\Default\Media Cache 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\EpicPrivacyBrowser\UserData\Default\Session Storage 
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  \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\EpicPrivacyBrowser\UserData\Default\Local Storage\leveldb 
 \Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat 
Internet 
Explorer $MFT 
 $Logfile 
 $Extend\$UsnJournal 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\Active 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Low\IE\ 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\AC\Temp 
 \Windows\System32\LogFiles\WMI 
 \Windows\Temp 
 Freespace 
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 Table 4: A breakdown of the number of keyword hits for test URL information for the Avant, Comodo Dragon, Edge, Epic and Internet 
Explorer browsers (Table submitted as separate file). 
Browser Browser Processing and Subsequent Number of Keyword Hits 
 
Avant:- 
simultane
ous 
search 
Avant:- 
refine 
volume 
snapshot + 
simultaneou
s search  
Internet 
Explorer:- 
simultaneous 
search 
Internet 
Explorer:- refine 
volume 
snapshot + 
simultaneous 
search 
Comodo 
Dragon:- 
simultane
ous 
search 
Comodo 
Dragon:- 
refine 
volume 
snapshot 
+ 
simultane
ous 
search 
Edge:- 
simultane
ous 
search 
Edge:- 
refine 
volume 
snapshot 
+ 
simultane
ous 
search 
Epic:- 
simultane
ous 
search 
Epic:- 
refine 
volume 
snapshot 
+ 
simultane
ous 
search 
blackbag 1024 1462 1383 1395 8 107 27 27 721 725 
mobilyze 276 483 916 944 0 0 28 28 250 250 
griffeye 618 936 879 886 1 26 22 22 445 450 
lunastar 143 172 349 351 0 0 20 20 88 100 
tdfcon 144 182 490 490 0 0 22 22 96 100 
pintofscience 642 1192 319 377 0 0 29 29 900 900 
blackbagtech.c
om  642 954 482 482 1 28 11 11 420 424 
griffeye.com  487 720 268 268 0 0 8 8 337 341 
comicseries.co
m 96 117 128 130 0 0 8 8 71 88 
tdfcon.com  96 107 156 156 0 0 8 8 58 62 
pintofscience.c
o.uk  121 178 200 232 0 0 5 5 72 72 
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 Table 5: A breakdown of the cached image locations for the Avant, Epic and Internet Explorer browsers (Table submitted as separate 
file). 
Browser Name Location 
Avant Freespace 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\AvantProfiles\.temp\sessions\132208\webkit\Default\Cache 
 Freespace 
Epic Freespace 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\EpicPrivacyBrowser\UserData\Default\Cache 
 \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\EpicPrivacyBrowser\UserData\Default\Media Cache 
Internet 
Explorer \Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Low\IE\ 
 Freespace 
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